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1 Prefatory Remarks 
One of the old and new problems raised by law， State， and society in 
transition， isthat of “shakai-tsunen" 1) ， inother words，“co勾munitystand-
ardぺ“present-daystandardぺ“communitysentiment"，“conventional moral-
ity" and so on.2) My aim of this paper is to make a brief survey on the usage 
of the shakai-tsunen mainly in the judicial process， espeGial1y by paying atte任
tion to this in Japan， for the purpose of grasping incidental or necessary CO!ト
nection both， philosophy of law， that is， jurisprudence and sociology of law. 
Shakai-tsunen， or the standard of this sort， 1 think， stil have a consider-
able weight in the judicia1 process， that is， a judicia1 interpretation and 
application of the law on the fol1owing reasons; First， the formal state law， 
* This is a paper origInally written for and read at X CONGRESO MUNDIAL ORDINARIO 
DE FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO Y FILOSOFIA SOCIAL which was held at Mexico City in 1981. 
And， it is this paper that， later， 1rpade a considerable change on that original manuscript“一“Role
and limits of “Shakai-tsunen" in law and Society in Japan". 
* Professor of Philosophy of Law， Faculty of Law， Osaka University， L.L.D. Tokyo University 
1968. 
1) 1 have written pap巴rson this topic. Here， 1 shall cite th巴min a following order; a) M. Yasaki， 
Philosophy of law and sociology of law， Iwanamishoten， 1973. b) Yasaki， Shakai-tsunen and位lelaw， 
Horitsujiho， No. 632， May， 1980. 
2) As to an example of American cases， see Roth v. United States， Alberts v. Stat巴ofCalifomia， 
354 U.S. 476，1957. Cf. also R. Dworkin， Lord Devlinand the enforcement ofmorals， 75The Yale 
L. J.， P.986， 1966. 
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whether statutory law or judicial precedent， especially in regard to some 
words provided by them， has a fringe， orpenumbra， t也hougl位1main taining core 
Oぱfce町rt臼a泊t句y.3吋) Sha北ka剖i-恒a耐加ne悶r民lし， 0ぽrthe standard of this s叩or討ti包svague by i託ts邸el吃1 
and of f1exible nature. Due to the nature， however， itis apt to be used in 
fringe case or penumbral case. Then， we may be confronted with a question 
of how to draw a borderline for such standard between proper use and abuse 
for the reason below. 
Secondly， asit is vague by itself and yet appea1ing， this starrdard is 
tended to be used as a genera11y and impartially va1id， maintained and 
observed standard担 agiven community， while in fact it may be a standard 
subjectively or even訂bitr訂丑yimaged， proposed and held by only a few 
members of that community. Then， there must be raised a question whether 
shakai-tsunen is a standard as it is or a standard as it ought to be (which 
means subjectively or partially wished， desired，' and so on). With these 
points in mind， 1 sha11 examine a few topics. 
1 Shakai-tsunen in the .Judicial Process 
The term shakai-tsunen has rather a long history of its usage in various 
fields of law in Japan.4) Quite a few judicial decisions often have found 
their material justification in such standards， for泊stance，sh北ai・kannen，
gojin no horitsu-kannen， horitsu no seishin， etc.， in torts cases， crimina1 
cases， or constitutiona1 cases， and so on. And yet we may find de1icate 
difference in such standards used in a variety of cases and fields of law. 
In a considerably older case. of marriage， the Supreme Court (Taishin-in 
at that time， 1915， 4th ye訂 ofTaisho)， by repeating citation of shakai剛
tsunen， permitted a reason in a c1aim of a “N aien" wife on her damage 
caused by one-sided dissolution of marriage， though the court fma11y 
rejecÚ~d it by means of curious judicia1 logic.5) On the other hand， the 
3) The technical terms used in the text are， mainly， due to modern think巴rs，such as like G. 
Williams， H.L. A. Hart. 
4) 1) a) pp. 196f. 220f. 2) b) p. 15. 
5) Judgement of Jan. 26， 1915， Taishin-in. A collection of civil Taishin-in cases， vol.21， P.53. 
The term “Naien" may be strange for readers. According to T. Kuki， it“is the relation between man 
and woman which is not legally admitted to be the lawful marriage on account of the failure of the 
registration which is laid down by the Family Registry Act. ..... Generally speaking the spouses 
go through the process of the celebration of the marriage !Irst， then the cohabitation. And most 
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Supreme Court， 1957， decided against the defendants' c1aim of nonguilty 
for th住 translationand publication of“Lady Chatterlay's Lover" by uti-
日zingshakai暢tsunenasa materia1 standard for punishment to be infringed.6) 
Putting aside the other interesting cases， we are tentatively to c1assifyat 
least three types of the usage of shakai-tsunen in the judicial process. 
1. Supplementary role 
Shakai-tsunen is given a role to make a supplement for an interpre-
tation of a written lega1 provision' which does not have a proper 
concepts for the relevant case， or does not cover the case， and so on， 
that is， for judicial treatment of the soca11ed open texture case or 
hard case. 
2. Modifying role 
Shakai-tsunen， furthermore， issometimes given a role materially to 
modify a written legal provision， leading to the soca11ed“judicia1 
legislation" . 
3. Facts.・部certainingrole 
To speak principally， shakai-tsunen has been used at the level of 
interpretation of law. But， itis hard to say that there was no case to 
use shakai-tsunen as a role for facts-ascertainment. 
The c1assification above probably indicates such standards being used in 
a very complicated way and often arbitrarily. Judicia1 decisions cite such 
standards， asif those were objective and evidental truth in a daily life， by 
spouses make the registration after their cohabitation. Customary conception， however， isthat m組
and woman become the forma1 couple by celebrating their marriage. Here lies the gap between our 
custom or general consciousness and the provision in the Act. ..... Th巴partiesto Naien are dis-
advantaged in the code in comparison to the parties to the lawful marriage." T. Kuki， Naien: On巴
problem in Japanese marriage law， 12 Osaka Univ. L. Rev.， pp. 9f.， 1964. The case cited in th巴textis 
of course related to this problem in Japan， though the situation around 1巴:galprotection of Naierトwife
has been getting better. 
6) This case is concerned with an interpretation of Art. 175 of Criminal Code of Japan. It says: 
一Aperson who distributes or sels a pornographic writing， picture， orother object or who publicly 
displays the same， shall be punished with inprisonment at forced labor for not more than two years or 
a fine of not more than five hundred yen or a minor fine. The same applies to a person who posseses 
the same for the purpose of sale." T. L. B1akemore， The criminallaw of Japan， 1950. This provision 
leaves judges a wider range of materia1 judgement on what pornographic， obscene is. It is for this 
reason that shakai帽tsunenis used in this case， too， asa material standard for judgement. In the cases 
of this sort， shakai-tsunen has been referred to as a stable gen巴rallyva1id standard. But， it is worth-
noticing that shakai-tsunen in a recent decision is used rather tolerantIy to the matter， which was 
treated as pornographic before， for the reason of change in a popular consciousness to it. Cf. Rea1m 
of Passion case， Judgement of Oct. 19，1979 Tokyo District Court. Hanrei-Times， No. 398， pp. 60ff. 
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saying “according to shakai-tsunen"， or “in terms of shakai・kannen"prevail-
ing泊 thecommunity. It leads sometimes not only to the “in terstitial" 
but apparent judicial legislation. But what initates us is their vague， or 
ambiguous usage in the judicial process. Should we then propose to give 
up such standards? No. As far as the formal state law， or the black-letter 
law is accompanied by open texture， we can't help to take into account 
that judge or official may utilize some other standards of similar nature， 
even though we might give up it. At the moment， itseems better for us to 
collect， c1arify， and anange to order a great deal of the decided cases on the 
ground of shakai-tsunen， for avoiding possible judicial interference in private 
individuals' freedom and right through this convenient means. But， leaving 
its examination to a next opportunity， let me now turn to daily 1ife. 
II Shakaトtsunenin a Dai1y Life 
Shakaiωtsunen is not only spoken of in the narrower field of law， but in 
a dai1y life. This is very natural， since shakai圃tsunenoriginal1y means stand-
ard or idea which is supposed to be dominant or prevalent in a given 
community， thus“community siandard". 
Human beings in daily 1ife are principally working together despite of 
the very fact of， so to speak， an apparently opposite relationship of ego to 
alter-ego. Each one is working mainly in terms of inter-subjective， though 
often conflicting， stream of thinking or consciousness which in turn， 
becomes a part of the social context.7) 
Viewed in the short term， certain type of shakai-tsunen as a loose form 
of shared va1ues appe訂spredominant in a given society. Viewed in the long 
teロn，however， it is gettmg c1earer that each different value-ideas of society 
are so keenly competing with another for a win that one occupies a post 
and role of shakai-tsunen only for a while. It is certain that shakai圃tsunen
works and yet also certain that it works only in a limited sense said above. 
Shakai-tsunen担 thissense is considerably similar to the socalled“socia1 
7) Intersubjective stream of thinking or consciousness is a sweeping expression. But， here 
1 take into account a long series of consideration on this topic through thinkers， W. Dilthey， W. James， 
Ed. Husserl， M. Weber， A. Schutz， and others. Cf. 1) b) pp. 10ff. P.L. Berger & S. Pullberg， Reifica-
tion and the socio1ogical critique of consciousness， 35 new left review， PP. 60f， 1966， and K. Klare， 
Law-making as a praxis， 40 Telos， 123， Summer， 1979， also offer relevant materials for this topic. 
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consensus". As wel1 as doctrines of social consensus differ with each other， 
shakai-tsunen， that is， conventional morality， community sentiment . . 
has been also looked from different point of view. 
For instance， J.Shklar once wrote as fol1ows: The "notion， that there is 
a stable community sentiment and that the judge may and should rely upon 
it rather than upon his own conscience and intelligence， ispolitically most 
dubious. It leads right to that pseudo-democracy of agreement among 
Clapham bus riders which J ustice Devlin proc1aimed and which from the 
liberal point of view is thoroughly dangerous.8)" Recently， J.侮 H.Ely p仰utおs 
it: 
discerned by a nondemoc白ra抗ticelite is sometimes referred tωO泊 theliterature 
as “t出heFu白ihrerprinciple，" and indeed it was Adolf Hi抗tlerwho said ‘“'My pride 
iおst也ha抗t1 know no sta拭tesmanin the wor1d who with greater right than 1 can 
say that he is the representative of his people." We know， however， that 
this is not an attitude limited to right-wing elites.9)" 
On the other hand， the notion as critized by Ely has been expressed 
by H. H. Wel1ington， though under various reservations: “The Court's 
task is to ascertain the weight of the principle in conventional morality and 
to convert the moral principle into a legal one by connecting it with the 
body of constitutional1aw".10) 
The law finds its roots in such a daily life and functions both as a guide 
for citizen's conduct on the one hand and as a means of official for dispute 
set1ement at the nonordinary level， etc. on the other. It is for this back-
ground that judge faced with fringe case， penumbral case sometimes tends to 
make a judgement by relying on that shakaiぺsunen. As we saw ab ove ， 
however， the standard is not evident itself， but flexible， changeable， and 
under usual variation. Strictry speaking， we are confronted with a problem 
of a distance of the term shakai-tsunen from a reality signified by it， or of a 
signifier from a signified. 
8) J. Shklar， Legalism， P.102， 1964. 
9) J. H. Ely， Democracy and distrust， P.68， 1980. 
10) H. H. Wellington， Common law rules and constitutional double standards， 83 Yale L. J.， 
P. 284， 1973. 
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IV Term and Rea1ity of Shakai-tsunen 
Judges， o ficials ， and individua1s， too， mostly believes， heartily or 
lipdeeply， inthe term as fitting the rea1ity. But， tolook at in detail， the 
term does not a1ways signify a reality. A relation of the term to reality， 
of a signifier to a signified may be expressed in the fol1owing approaches:l1) 
1. An' approach to understand and define shakai-tsunen in terms of the 
empirical facts clarified by means of sociology and psychology. 
It may be cal1ed a natura1istic approach to translate value-related 
concept into facts-related concept， or normative concept into les-
normative natural concept. 
2. Pseudo-naturalistic approach. Though adopting the frst approach 
on a surface， itin rea1ity differs from this， since it manipulates， 
consciously or unconsciously， to show relevant matters as treated 
according to the less-normative (objective) shakai-tsunen， while it 
actua11y treat shakai-tsunen from its normative (subjective) point 
ofview. 
3. Non-naturalistic approach. Permitting normative factors担 shakai-
tsunen which， more or les， can not be reduced to empirical or 
natural facts， itsti1 aims at objectively to grasp shakaiぺsunen
through reflexion， intuition. 
4. An approach to give up a way for an objectivecognizance of shakai-
tsunen for the reason of normative or emotive factors involved 
in it. But， there remain perhaps two possibi1ities. 
One is to make a distinction， ifpossible， between aspects in 
shakai-tsunen which can not be cognitive due to that emotive factors 
dominant and those which come to be cqgnitive in effect of artificial 
discerning from that emotive - Noncognitivistic approach 
another is to see担 shakai-恒unena kind of“fiction" .12) 
To apply these approaches to the examples in the judicia1 process and 
a daily life mentioned above， we may perhaps find an interesting set of 
11) M. Ossowska， Social determinants of moral ideas， PP. 12ff.， 1970， is one of interesting 
examples for us to make such a tentative c1assification. 
12) Cf. 1) a) P. 262. 
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combination_ The first approach may be a main concern of Sociologica1 
jurists. By contrast， sceptica1 thinkers may adopt the latter of the fourth 
approach. If we look at dai1y life， from which shakai-tsunen is supposed 
to arise，担 adistance， critically， ina cold attitude， this standard may appear 
as one of typical examples symbolyzing snobbery， ug1iness and furthermore， 
fa1seness in the late capitalist society .13) 
In this context， the latter of the fourth， that is， an approach seeing in 
shakai-tsunen a kind of fiction may appeal us very strong1y. 
V Shakai-tsunen in Law and Society 
Even though we may admit this approach as pursuasive， itmust also 
be recalled in mind that shakai-tsunen sti1 has been mentioned and used 
in such a socia1 context. In looking back the starting point of this essay 
from a perspective of the social context， itreminds us furthermore at least 
two aspects of the problems we are faced with. 
The frst is an aspect of actors in society and the state， for example， 
officials， judges， prosecutors， councils in law， and citizens or private individ・
uals. Shakai-tsunen is supposed to be predominant between them， asfar 
as viewed in a short term. At the same time， asfar as each of them are 
given a each different position， role， and personality， itis natural that they 
mention to and adopt shakai-tsunen from their each own different， there-
fore， unique point of view， assaid above. This tendency may be much more 
apparent and impressive in the case of “social consensus" in crisis， asseen 
13) We may also find an interesting process in出issocia1 consciousness in relation to socia1 action 
and socia1 settings (including lega1 institution). For instance， Berger組 dPullberg， 7)， PP. 60f， paid 
設leirattention to four key terms， which in turn may serve for our understanding of the problems， that 
is， objectivation， objectification， alienation and reification: "By objectivation we mean that process 
whereby human subjectivity embodies itsel[ in products that are available to onesel[ and one's [ellow 
men as elements o[ a common world. This process， we must emphasize from the beginning， isan世uo駒
pologica1ly n巴cess紅Y…... By objecti，β'cation we mean the moment in the process o[ objectivation in 
which man establishes distance ρ'Om his producing and its product， such that he can take cognizance 
o[ it and make o[ it an object o[ his consciousness...... Byalienation we mean the process by which 
the unity o[ the producing and the product is broken. The product now appears to the producer as 
釦 alienfacticity and power stan出ngin itself叩 dover against 泊 n，no longer recognizable as a 
product ・・・ . By re(βcation we mean the moment in the process o[ alienation in which the character-
istic o[ thinghood becomes the standard o[ objective reality. That is， nothing can be conceived of as 
real that does not have the character of a thing. This can a1so be put in different words: rei[icationた
object析'cationin an alienated mode..…'¥ 
8 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [No.29 
during the period about ten years after 1965.14) Democracy， the mle 
of law idea on the one hand， belief in freedom and equality on the other， 
which former1y were seen as re1iable by considerable members of society， 
appear gradually to having been shaken in contrast with reality. Each actors， 
whether immediately or not， are responding to those situation reflection of 
which requires us to reexamine each of their value orientation in similarity 
and distance between them. 
The second is the law in a changing prof1e. Corresponding to the situa-
tion above， the law in tum has been forced to respond. In 1976， R.M. Unger 
puts it in the following way:“Whether one accepts the hypothesis of the 
circ1e or that of the spira1， it is important to remember that the three.kinds 
of law present themselves historically as over1apping and interpenetrating 
realms， rather than as neatly separated worlds. The legal profession and 
legal education担 postlibera1society show the juxtaposition of concems 
with al these forms of law and lega1 thought. This universe has an outer 
sphere of blackletter law: the area wherein the rule of law ideal and the 
specia1ized methods of legal ana1ysis flourish. Then there is an inner sphere 
of bureaucratic law and bureaucratic rhetoric. At this level， law is ap-
proached instrumentally; one talks of costs and benefits， and one searches 
for a science of po1icy that can help the administrative and the professional 
elite exercise its power in the name of impersona1 technique and social 
welfare. But， beyond legalistic forma1ity and bureaucratic instrumenta1ism， 
lie the inchoate senses of equity and solidarity.15) 
In 1979 Shigeaki Tanaka impressively offers three pattems of law as 
models for ana1yzing contemporary law in J apan by comparison to the 
Westem， 1) universalistic pattem of law as a product of liberal legalism， 
2) regulatory pattem of law as serving for realization of policy purpose， 
3) autonomous pattem of law as expressing popu1ar demands (and official 
14)“The current crisis of authority， with its accompanying dispraise of law， has its immediate 
sourc巴 inthe socia1 turbulence of the 1960s. That decade poignant1y displayed the two faces of 
justice. On the one hand， some courts and some sectors of the legal profession mad巴 themselves
spokesmen for the disprivileged; they interpreted their mission as the enlargement of rights and 
the fulfillment of the latent promise of the Constitution-full citizenship for all-and the movement 
for socia1 advocacy and public-interest law gained wide support. On the other hand， during the 
same decade the law wor巴jackboots and acted repressively to stamp out the fires of discontent." 
Nonet & Selznick， 17)， p.5. 
15) R. M. Unger， Law in modern society， P.241， 1976. 
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response) on the new legal issues caused by changing social conditions.16) 
In 1978 P. Nonet and P. Selznick wrote:“In this essey we give special 
attention to a range of law-related variables. ..... Each of these variables 
differs significant1y as the context is changed. ..... The theory we propose 
is an attempt to clarify these systematic connections and to identify the 
characteristic configurations in which they occur. We distinguish three 
modalities or basic “states" of law-in-society: (1) law as the servant of 
repressive power， (2) law as differentiated institution capable of taming 
repression and protecting its own integrity， and (3) law as a facilitator of 
response to social needs and aspirations. For example， although coercion is 
present in al three types， itssignificance varies: It is dominant in repressive 
law， moderated in autonomous law， and submerged in responsive law. 
Again， the role of purpose must be considered in each system: There is 
a repressive instrumentalism in which law is bent to the wi1l of governing 
power; there is a withdrawal from purpose in the striving for autonomous 
law; and there is a renewal of instrumentalism， but for more objective public 
ends， inthe context of responsive law . . . . 17)". 
These models immediately raise a question of their relation to sh北ai鋼
tsunen. In recalling that ambiguous and flexible use of shakai聞tsunen泊
both， daily life and the judicial process， we may perhaps easily get an inト
pression， that its use is moderated， toborrow from Nonet's and Selznicピs
technical term， in“autonomous law" mainly because of its legal formality， 
while dominant泊 repressivelaw as a convenient means for repression as 
mentioned by E1y on Hitler's case， and in responsive law as expressing 
hot demands gradually and spontaneously made， for instance， by certain 
disadvantaged members of society泊 crisis. But， propriety of this frst 
impression must be carefully examined again in detail. Furthermore， itis 
also case with those law models. It may be necessary for us to take担to
consideration which is more convenient and proper to offer law models 
in such a way， or to show an internal differention of the modern State law 
16) Shigeaki Tanaka， Saiban 0 meguru hδto se話i(Law and politics as underlying adjudication)， 
Yuhikaku，1979. 
17) P. Nonent and P. Selznick， Law and society in transition， P.15， 1978. 
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into each different function or role18). 
But， we must be content， atthis occasion， with such a simple remark 
on relevancy of new aspects， or conditions in society， law and the State 
to the study of shakai-tsunen. 
18) What is anxious about this type of classification is that it might convince us of “thereness" of， 
so to speak， nascent law， such as like responsive law or repressive law， while it has indeed a merit for 
us to acknowledge the changing reality泊 certainnames of law. 
